Customs Censorship by Sigler, Jay A.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU




Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jay A. Sigler, 15 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 58 (1966)
Customs Censorship
Jay A. Sigler*
T HE AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT is engaged in a vast
program of censorship which includes a wider range of
materials than that usually controlled by local government
authority. The attention of the courts and the press has been
concentrated primarily upon state and local censorship, but
federal activity is usually more significant. The federal govern-
ment has used the postal and customs powers, derived from Ar-
ticle I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, to regulate both the internal
movement of undesirable material and its entry from abroad.
The postal power has been treated elsewhere,' but the customs
power is at least as important because it can reach any material
transported by any mode of communication as long as the point
of origin is outside the United States.2 Not only is the customs
power broader in scope, but its administration has been met with
much less criticism and resistance than that of the Post Office.
The first successful Congressional attempt at censorship re-
sulted in the passage of the Customs Law of 1842. This statute
contained a section which prohibited pictorial art from being
imported if it was "indecent or obscene." 3 It did not, as later
statutes have done, regulate the printed word. From time to
time the areas of censorship have been expanded, culminating
in the censorship sections of the Tariff Act of 1930, which is the
basic source of authority for the Bureau of Customs. 4
Prior to the passage of the Tariff Act the customs officers
often acted arbitrarily, excluding a great many acknowledged
masterworks of art and literature.5 As a response to unfavorable
* B.A., MA., LL.B., Ph.D., Rutgers Univ.; Ass't. Professor of Political Sci-
ence, Rutgers Univ.
I Sigler, Freedom of the Mails: A Developing Right, 54 Georgetown L. J.
(#1) (Fall 1965).
2 U. S. v. 10,000 Copies New York Nights et al., 10 F. Supp. 726 (S. D. N. Y.,
1935) rests upon this fundamental presumption. See also McGlinchy v.
U. S., 4 Cliff. 319, Fed. Cas. No. 8, 803 (D. Maine, 1875).
3 5 Stat. 566, Sec. 18 (1842).
4 46 Stat. 688 (1930); 19 U. S. C. 1305 (a) (1952). The Act's provisions were
in substantially the same language as those of the previous Act of October
3, 1913 (C. 16, Sec. IV, subsec. 1, 2 and 3, 38 Stat. 194) although many
minor changes had been made from 1913 to 1930.
5 Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints (1956), p. 89.
See also 59 New Republic 176 (1930) and Publisher's Weekly, Feb. 22, 1930,
p. 984.
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publicity and to judicial pressure the Customs Bureau came to
rely upon the advice of an outside expert to determine the qual-
ity of a claimed literary work. Since 1934 Huntington Cairns
has advised the Treasury and the Customs Bureau on questions
of obscenity in imported items. Cairns serves, officially, as secre-
tary, treasurer and general counsel of the National Gallery of
Art. As a lawyer Cairns came to the attention of the then Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, because of his critical
writing in the Baltimore Sun and because he had successfully
defeated the government in a censorship case. 7 Since the ap-
pointment of Cairns as unofficial censor little public controversy
and few contests over determination of obscenity have arisen.,
Nonetheless, Cairns and Customs officials have encouraged sev-
eral test cases so that the limitations of Customs censorship are
marked out to some extent.9 Statutory language also tends to
protect works determined to be of "established literary or scien-
tific merit." 10 Other kinds of Customs censorship remain contro-
versial and some unresolved issues of obscenity remain.
The Tariff Act of 1930
The basic source of authority for Customs Censorship is
found in Section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which treats the
problem as an aspect of Congress' general control over imports."
Despite some minor changes in language the current statute is
essentially the same as the parallel portion of the Act of October
6 See Huntington Cairns, Freedom of Expression in Literature, 200 Annals
of Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci. 81 (November, 1938).
7 Whitehead, Border Guard (1963), pp. 234-235.
8 On taking the position Cairns inquired of a customs employee on what
grounds he excluded books from entry. The clerk replied "Well, if I see a
book with a naked woman in it, a photograph, I hold it up." This same
clerk had refused admittance to the third shipment of James Joyce's
Ulysses because it was a "dirty book." This was ascertained in a first read-
ing after several hundred books had already entered. The clerk's suspicion
had been aroused by the high price ($15) for the paperbound volume (In
Ibid., p. 238).
9 According to Gellhorn, op. cit., supra, n. 5, p. 90, "because the censorialjudgment is now excercised with good sense and moderation, few adverse
rulings are sought to be appealed."
10 As an exception to the general restrictions upon importation of obscene
materials the Secretary of the Treasury may "admit the so-called classic
or work of recognized and established literary or scientific merit . . . when
imported for non-commercial purposes," 62 Stat. 862 (1948).
11 46 Stat. 688 (1930) 19 U. S. C. 1305. The C. F. R. contains substantially
the same language at 19 C. F. R. 12.40.
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3, 1913,12 which superseded previous tariff act provisions. The
act prohibits all persons "from importing into the United States
from any foreign country any book, pamphlet, paper . .. contain-
ing any matter advocating or urging treason or insurrection
against the United States, or forcible resistance to any law of the
United States or containing any threat to take the life of or in-
flict bodily harm upon any person in the United States." 13 In
addition the act prohibits importation of "any obscene book,
pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture,
drawing or other representation." 14 Also prohibited are any
drugs or medicines "or any article whatever for the prevention
of conception or for causing unlawful abortion." Lottery tickets
are included within the ban. The procedure for seizure is de-
scribed and protests are to be taken to the United States District
Court rather than to the Customs Court. Formal legal proceed-
ings are to be instituted through the Federal district attorney,
so that all the protections of a normal judicial hearing are pro-
vided in order to complete the process of forfeiture, confiscation
or destruction of the matter involved.
The novel initial portion of the statute, which refers to im-
portation of matter containing threats to do bodily harm to any
person, is the result of a 1929 Congressional compromise. The
section is clarified by the Congressional debates which indicate
that the original intent was to block threats to the life of the
President.15 The first part of the phrase is of considerably great-
er significance. Taken literally, the phrase "any matter advo-
cating or urging treason or insurrection" could reach mere ab-
stract ideas or non-action.' 6 Professor Chafee expressed his
doubts as to the constitutionality of this provision because, he
felt, the clause created an effective censorship over foreign liter-
12 38 Stat. 194 (1913).
13 Ibid., sec. a.
14 Ibid. This applies explicitly to any "image on or of paper or other ma-
terial, or any cast, instrument, or other article which is obscene or im-
moral." The language is obviously as comprehensive a prohibition as pos-
sible.
15 Senator Couzens submitted an amendment to add after the words "forci-
ble resistance to any law of the United States" the phrase "or containing
any threat to take the life of or inflict bodily harm upon any person in the
United States" (71 Cong. Rec. 4463).
16 See Ibid., p. 4471. Many of the defenders of the language appeared to
have a morbid fear of Communism and anarchism while its detractors
quoted Milton, Franklin and Jefferson.
Jan., 1966
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ature, including many desirable books and pamphlets which con-
tain discussions of social and economic matters.17
Senator Cutting sought to strike out Section 305 entirely and
return to the substance of the law of 1842 which barred works
of art of an indecent character and instruments for the preven-
tion of conception. This amendment was defeated and the pas-
sages referring to the advocacy of treason or insurrection were
retained.' Section 305 passed the Senate in substantially its
present form by a vote of 38 to 36.19 The language of this section
could be used to cover virtually any radical document imported
into the country. In the absence of Supreme Court interpreta-
tions, or even lower court opinions, the Customs Bureau seems
to possess sweeping authority in this area.20 Senator Burton K.
Wheeler expressed his opposition to this innovation in the most
colorful language: 21
Just think of what we are doing in these times. We
are leaving it up to some clerk in a department to say
whether or not some individual is bringing in a treasonable
article. An individual might bring in a paper which some
little two-by-four clerk in the department might say is
treasonable. The man who brought the paper in, then, would
be branded all over this country as one who had treasonable
literature in his possession. . . It seems to me it is abso-
lutely foolish to leave the decision of such a question in the
hands of some clerk and give such power to him when we
have all the laws upon the statute book at the present time
which we need.
Customs procedures under the Tariff Act differ from those
of the subsequent provisions of the "communist political prop-
aganda" portion of the United States Code.22 Upon seizure of an
item under the Tariff Act a notice of the seizure is sent to the
consignee or addressee. 23 If the articles are of slight value and
17 Professor Chafee pointed out that the language seemed directed against
any kind of revolution, whether within or without the United States (Ibid.,
p. 4450). Fears were expressed by others that the works of Marx, Proud-
hon, Bakunin, Bertrand Russell, or even the English edition of Jefferson's
works could be excluded. (Ibid.)
18 Ibid., p. 4457.
19 Ibid., 4472. Cutting's amendment had been defeated by 44 to 33 (Ibid.,
p. 4461).
20 This question is treated in the concluding section, but it is surprising
that there are no cases directly concerned with this issue.
21 71 Cong. Rec. 4446.
22 74 Stat. 654, 39 U. S. C. 4008.
23 Sec. 12.40(6), Customs Regulations of the United States (1964).
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no criminal intent is apparent, a blank assent to forfeiture (Cus-
toms Form 4609) is sent together with the notice. If the form,
duly executed, is returned to Customs authorities the articles
are destroyed "if not needed for official use" and the case
closed.24 In cases involving repeated offenders or clear intent
to evade the law the material is sent to the United States attor-
ney who may institute prosecution as well as an in rem action
for condemnation of the articles under Section 305.25 The im-
porter has 30 days to submit to Customs forfeiture by assent, or
else risk a similar suit. Most cases result in voluntary com-
pliance by the importers as evidenced by the very few recorded
instances of formal actions instituted by the United States
attorney.
Obscene articles (especially books) may be seized, and the
importer raise as a defense that the book is a classic, or of recog-
nized and established literary and scientific merit. In such cases
a petition may be sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, with
supporting evidence. If the ruling is favorable, release of the
book is made but only to the ultimate consignee. 26 Films which
have been exposed by a foreign concern or individual are pre-
viewed by "a qualified employee of the Customs Service." 27
Objectionable films are detained pending instructions from the
higher officials of the Customs Bureau or a final decision of the
courts.28 Customs Form 3291 is provided importers in order to
certify that the films contain "no obscene or immoral matter, nor
any matter advocating or urging treason or insurrection against
the United States or any forcible resistance to any law of the
United States." 29 Again, considerable voluntary compliance
seems to have taken place in this area. Obviously, wide admin-
istrative discretion is permitted by these rules.
24 Ibid., 12.40(c). TD 44293; TD 44766; TD 53866. This procedure is not
employed in cases of matter advocating treason or insurrection or matter
containing threats. Such material "is transmitted to the United States at-
torney for his consideration and action." (Ibid., 12.40(a), TD 53399).
25 Ibid., 12.40(a); TD 52025. Criminal prosecution is possible under 18
U. S. C. 1461 and 1462.
26 Sec. 12.40(g) Customs Regulations. TD 42908; TD 43600; TD 44342; TD
44884 (7); TD 46042 (1); TD 47412. As previously indicated, this may prac-
tically mean that the judgment of Huntington Cairns will be consulted.
27 Sec. 12.41 (b) Customs Regulations.
2s Ibid., 12.41 (c).
29 Ibid., 12.41 (2); BCL 1920/38; TD 53268; TD 53336. Curiously, there are
very few court cases concerning films (see Eureka Products Inc. v. Mulli-
gan, 108 F. 2d 760 (2d Cir., 1940)).
Jan., 1966
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The rules regarding non-obscene articles reflect the pressure
of judicial standards of interpretation.30  Drugs or medicines
which, from information on the container or its immediate sur-
roundings, are "intended for preventing conception or inducing
abortion" will be detained and seized.31 Devices imported by or
for the use of a particular physician are not detained if the col-
lector of the customs is satisfied that the ultimate consignee is
a reputable physician.32 If the importer does not satisfy the col-
lector of the customs as to his eligibility he may, nonetheless, file
a claim addressed to the Commissioner of Customs.
The Bureau of Customs publishes no list of books, pam-
phlets or other publications which are officially proscribed.
There does exist, for internal use, a file of titles and a list of the
disposition made in specific cases. From time to time instruc-
tions are issued from the Washington headquarters to collectors
of customs which serve as guidelines "but for the most part these
are by way of comment on current interpretations by the Fed-
eral Courts." 33
Communist Political Propaganda
On January 7, 1963 the provisions of Public Law 87-793 went
into effect. This statute refers primarily to unsealed mailed mat-
ter entering the country from abroad, and as such, concerns both
the Post Office and the Customs Bureau. The statute empowers
the Secretary of the Treasury to determine "pursuant to rules
and regulations to be promulgated by him to be 'communist po-
litical propaganda.' "34 At that point the Postmaster General
may detain propaganda mail and notify the addressee of the de-
tention, delivering the mail only upon the addressee's request.
Exceptions are made for subscription materials or matter ad-
dressed to any United States government agency, or to a public
library, college or research institution.
30 In U. S. v. One Book Entitled "Contraception," 51 F. 2d 525 (S. D. N. Y.,
1931) Judge Woolsey held that a book intended for medical use is not ob-
scene. U. S. v. One Package, 86 F. 2d 737 (2d Cir., 1936) holds that Section
305 does not ban articles used by a physician to prevent conception with
the intention of protecting the patient's health. This is the same interpreta-
tion applied to postal practices in contraceptive control.
31 Sec. 12.40 (h), Customs Regulations.
32 Sec. 12.40 (i); T. D. 53268. The physician must file a statement asserting
that the devices are to be used only to protect the health of his patients.
33 Letter to author from Irving Fishman, Assistant Deputy Commissioner,
Bureau of Customs (dated February 10, 1965).
34 39 U. S. C. 4008.
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In effect, the Bureau of Customs has been assigned the task
of censoring certain mail in order to determine whether it is
"communist political propaganda." The Bureau is given some
standards to gauge the political content of these mails by statu-
tory reference to several earlier acts, but none of the statutes
referred to actually provide a definition of communist propa-
ganda.3 5
Even prior to the current statute the Foreign Agent's Regis-
tration Act of 1938, as amended in 1942, had been construed by
Customs and Postal authorities to imply that political propa-
ganda coming into the country must be labelled as such.36 For
some years the Customs Bureau has been classifying, for pur-
poses of labelling, items regarded as "Communist political prop-
aganda." Typical publications include Lenin's Selected Works,
and Happy Life of Children in the Rumanian People's Repub-
lic.3 7 Customs officials checked each incoming publication against
circulars issued by the Bureau of Customs which contained lists
of foreign publications which have been ruled admissible under
agency definitions made under the authority of the Foreign
Agent's Registration Act.38 No general publication of these lists
was made available to the public. However, under the Act for-
eign agents were permitted to bring such propaganda into the
country with them.
The constitutionality of the registration provisions of the
Foreign Agent's Registration Act seems clear. 39 The Supreme
Court has upheld a conviction for violation of the statute and
35 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U. S. C. 611
(j)). Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (19 U. S. C.
1362) and several other acts are mentioned but the 1938 Registration Act is
by far the most important because of the years of experience in its appli-
cation. It is in that experience, if anywhere, that a definition is to be
found. Part 9 of the Customs Regulations was amended to meet the statu-
tory requirement by adding a new section (Sec. 9.13) to place in the collec-
tions of customs the authority to determine whether "mailed matter, except
sealed letters, which originates or which is printed or otherwise prepared
in a foreign country is 'Communist political propaganda' within the mean-
ing of subsection (b) of 39 U. S. C. 4008." Thus, a completely circular defi-
nition of "Communist political propaganda" is provided.
36 Act of June 8, 1938, 52 Stat. 631, as amended, Act of April 29, 1942, Sec.
4, 56 Stat. 248, 255. See Note, Government Exclusion of Foreign Political
Propaganda, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (1955).
37 Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of
the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) p. 237.
38 Ibid., p. 229; pp. 232-256.
39 Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236 (1943).
Jan., 1966
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First or Fifth Amendment claims have been rejected in the Dis-
trict Court.40 Registration under the Act was mentioned in a
favorable light by Justice Black in his dissent in a 1961 case,
which seems to assure the principle of disclosure upon which
the Act is based.
41
The current Communist propaganda statutes reflect an in-
tention of Congress to keep Communist publications out of the
hands of unsuspecting citizens.42 Thus it is a true censorship
statute rather than a mere registration requirement. Constitu-
tional questions of a far graver nature are presented. It is quite
possible that the doctrine of prior restraint on speech may yet
be applied to restrict or prohibit political censorship of Commu-
nist propaganda. 43 Since the doctrine of prior restraint deals
with limitations of form rather than substance the constitutional
issue involved a possibility of a direct challenge of the activities
of the Customs censor (as well as the Postal censor).
The administration of censorship of Communist propaganda
requires close cooperation between Customs and Postal author-
ities, although the Customs officials are charged with de-
tecting propaganda material. Foreign propaganda units are
maintained in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Honolulu, El Paso, New Orleans, Miami, Seattle and San Juan,
Puerto Rico. The postal official shakes out the mail sacks at the
40 United States v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D. D. C.,
1951). Judge Holtzoff based the authority for the Act upon the inherent
power of Congress to regulate external affairs as well as its power to legis-
late concerning national defense. The registration provision was regarded
as neither a regulation of ideas nor a burden upon speech.
41 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, at
p. 139 (1961). Black approved the registration because, unlike the situation
under the Internal Security Act as he saw it, it was based on the principle
of disclosure and was not an attempt to incriminate foreign agents or for-
eign publications.
42 Representative Morris K. Udall, one of the major supporters of the Com-
munist propaganda statute, stated: "There are really two justifications for
this legislation. One ... is the injustice of our taking the time and expense
to deliver all kinds of Communist mail and magazines when they wouldn't
deliver ours. The second one was that we ought to protect, somehow, inno-
cent Americans who might be gullible from the flow of Communist propa-
ganda." (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postal Operations of the
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service House of Representatives, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., June 20, 1963, p. 56).
43 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1930). See Emerson, The Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 20 Law and Contemp. Prob. 648 (1955). Emerson points
out that prior restraint prevents advance screening of material which could
be subsequently punished after publication. In the case of Communist
propaganda, however, no criminal deed is committed by subsequent publi-
cation, a fact which makes the censorship even more dubious.
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point of entry, sends on the sealed letters and detains the rest
for customs examination, excepting matter he feels to be exempt.
Customs "divides it up into two piles basically, and they give the
Postal officials immediately . . . the non-propaganda which goes
back into the mail flow" while the propaganda goes into the file
room.44 The propaganda material is held by the Post Office
which informs the addressee of the arrival of the mail and per-
mits him to request forwarding. 45 During the censoring process
customs and postal officials work together in the same room, pos-
sibly sharing impressions of the propaganda-like character of the
mail. 46 When asked whether he thought the propaganda control
statutes were in effect diminishing the amount of incoming Com-
munist propaganda, the Deputy Collector of Customs candidly
expressed the opinion that it did not.
47
The practice of Customs seizure of foreign propaganda is
not new. During World War I German propaganda and, later,
left-wing propaganda was suppressed, even in the absence of any
statute.48 During the 1950's the Post Office and the Customs
Bureau engaged in a program of general confiscation of mail
thought to be Communist propaganda. This also was done in the
absence of specific legislation on the basis of executive orders
and interpretations of the Attorney-General. Customs officials,
often lacking any training in foreign languages, seized, detained
or destroyed all matter deemed by them to be propaganda.49 It
44 Lamont v. The Postmaster-General of the United States, 229 F. Supp.
913 (S. D. N. Y., 1964) and Heilberg v. Fila, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N. D. Cal.,
1964). The latter case declared the statute to be unconstitutional because
the law inhibited the spread of ideas and was "a clear and direct invasion
of First Amendment territory." As described by Tyler Abell, Associate
General Counsel, Post Office Department, June 20, 1963 in Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Postal Operations of the Committee on the Post Office
and Civil Service, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), pp. 44-45.
45 Post Office Notice Form 21403X is employed for this purpose.
46 "In point of fact, you have customs people and postal people working in
a room ... they kind of exchange functions, and there is not too much we
can do about it, we just hope that it goes right most of the time," Abell,
op. cit., supra., n. 44, at p. 40.
47 "If the intent is to keep this mail out of the country, then we are not
accomplishing our purpose," Testimony of Irving Fishman, on June 19,
1963, in ibid., p. 20.
48 See United ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Bur-
leson, 255 U. S. 407 (1921).
49 Schwartz and Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A
Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 621
(1959). Mathematical magazines, chess magazines and academic journals
(Continued on next page)
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remains to be seen whether the current more orderly statutory
procedure will result in careful, judicious practices.
The Case-Law Limits
There is a paucity of case-law material interpreting the
power of Customs censorship. This is probably due to the gen-
erally non-contested character of issues arising under the Tariff
Act of 1930. However, it is possible that challenges to the Com-
munist propaganda statutes may generate a subsequent chal-
lenge to long-accepted practices of Customs officials. It is also
likely that questions which have been treated in another context,
such as the nature of obscene materials,50 will make unnecessary
further litigation in the Customs area. Existing cases do disclose
a definite pattern of limitation and will probably determine the
future contours of the law of customs censorship.
That Congress possesses the authority "under its general
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations" to "prescribe
what articles shall be admitted and what excluded" has been
long established. 51 No case represents a successful challenge to
that general assertion, although, as with other powers of Article
I, there may be some ultimate limitation on Congressional au-
thority. Occasionally the statutory language has been narrowly
(Continued from preceding page)
were among the victims. In 1940 Attorney-General Robert H. Jackson held
that the use of our mails by persons outside the United States for the pur-
pose of committing an act which, if committed here, would constitute a
violation of a criminal statute renders the disseminator an unregistered
agent here if the conduct involved a violation of Section 22 of the Espion-
age Act (30 Ops. Atty. Gen. 535). As a result of this ruling Customs and
Postal officials were apparently authorized to intercept and destroy any
material which they considered to be political propaganda. At times in the
past customs officials have stopped vast quantities of "Back to the Home-
land" mailings as political propaganda. Consent of the addressees was
first obtained (Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 4705-18; 6055-56; 6070-71 (1957)).
50 The most important recent expression of Supreme Court views is repre-
sented by Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U. S. 478 (1962). This case ex-
hibits a distrust of administrative determinations of obscenity generally
(pp. 497-98). Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) sets the standard
of prurient interest as determined by applying community standards per-
ceived by a hypothetical average person. Obscenity has been the subject
of a vast and growing literature but it is noteworthy that the judicially
announced standards have been applied to every type of determination,judicial or administrative; state, federal or local.
51 The Licence Cases, 5 How. 577 (1847). These cases affirmed the prin-
ciple as applied to state regulations on imported liquor.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/8
15 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
interpreted, 2 but no significant substantive restrictions have as
yet been announced. Claims of prior censorship in the applica-
tion of Customs censorship to books have been rejected,53 and
other First Amendment contentions dismissed. 54
Special procedural rules have evolved around obscenity
cases. Recently a California District Court held that seizure and
forfeiture of obscene materials under the Tariff Act does not per-
mit forfeiture of non-obscene material in the same package.55
Seizure of the package is permissible but forfeiture depends
upon proof of the obscenity of each item. The collector of cus-
toms is authorized by statute to seize any obscene matter and
hold it awaiting the judgment of the district court. The collector
is to send information to the district attorney who institutes pro-
ceedings for forfeiture, confiscation or destruction of the seized
matter.56 Any party in interest may on demand have the fact of
obscenity determined by a jury.57 A decision in one federal court
on a particular book will be res judicata in another court.58
The discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury to admit
certain literary classics does not establish his discretion as the
sole means by which scientists and scholars can import material
for their own study. It is open to proof in a federal court that
52 Sec. 1 of the Act of 1912 (37 Stat. 240) prohibited the importation of
prize-fight films in categorical language. Rose v. St. Clair, 28 F. 2d 192
(D. C. Va., 1928) narrowed the language greatly to permit an exhibition
of a film which itself was not physically imported. (It was projected across
the Canadian border.) This District Court case is a rare example of judi-
cial restriction of a substantive provision in the area of Customs censor-
ship.
53 United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F. 2d
821 (S. D. N. Y., 1931). Judge Woolsey asserted that the section does not
involve the suppression of a book before it is published, but the exclusion
of an already published book sought to be imported.
54 Section 1305 of the Tariff Act has been held not to be an unconstitu-
tional interference with freedom of the press (United States v. One Book
etc., 51 F. 2d 525 (S. D. N. Y., 1931); United States v. One Obscene Book,
48 F. 2d 821 (S. D. N. Y., 1931)).
55 United States v. 18 Packages of Magazines, 227 F. Supp. 198 (N. D. Cal.,
1963). By tracing the development of current provisions of Sec. 1305
through its legislative history the Court (Judge Sweigart) distinguished
two older precedents which had permitted destruction of the entire pack-
age, obscene and non-obscene materials both (United States v. One Case
Stereoscopic Slides, 27 Fed. Cas. 255 (1857) and United States v. Three
Cases of Toys, 28 Fed. Cas. 112 (1843)).
56 19 U. S. C. 1305 a.
57 Upham v. Dill, 195 F. Supp. 5 (S. D. N. Y., 1961).
58 United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," op. cit.,
supra, n. 53.
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matter which could be obscene in the hands of the general pub-
lic might be of scientific concern, hence importable for that pur-
pose. 9 In determining whether a book is obscene opinion evi-
dence is useful although not controlling. 0 Literary works such
as Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn have
been found obscene, 61 while James Joyce's Ulysses has been held
not to be obscene "in its dominant effect." 62 Recently customs
censorship in the area of literary works appear to have become
more liberal in response to Supreme Court rulings in other types
of obscenity cases, thus permitting the entry of books such as
Candy which contain some salacious passages.63
Any material which is seized must be held in accordance
with statutory procedure. Failure to follow that procedure may
result in suit against the customs collector, but return of the
goods is not a complete remedy nor is repentance. 64 One may
not, however, maintain a suit to restrain the customs collector
from interfering with importation of an item because the statute
provides a libel proceeding to test importability of materials
alleged to be obscene.6 5 On the other hand, a suit to condemn
material seized on land should be brought as an action in law
and, if seized at sea, a libel of information in admiralty is the
proper procedure. 6 All property taken or detained under the
revenue laws are not repleviable, but remain in the custody of
59 United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S. D. N. Y., The only
case restricting power of the Secretary of 1957).
60 Besig v. United States, 208 F. 2d 142 (9th Cir., 1953).
61 Ibid., applying the "dirt for dirt's sake" test of Burstein v. United States,
178 F. 2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949).
62 United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F. 2d
705 (2nd Cir., 1934).
63 The book was first printed in France where its co-authors Southern and
Hoffenburg wrote it under the pseudonym "Maxwell Kenton." Recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court favorable to such films as Lady Chatterly's
Lover (Kingley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684
(1959) and homosexual magazines, Manual Enterprises v. Day, op. cit.
supra, note 50, have, together with the Roth case rules, 354 U. S. 476 (1957)
served to discourage literary censorship by Customs.
G4 Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 147 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir., 1945). The publica-
tions in question included "The Bible Handbook" by Foot and Ball and
"Papacy in Politics Today" by McCabe. The customs collector did not
transmit information to the district attorney as Sec. 1305 requires. This
caused an illegal delay and detention of six months.
65 Upham v. Dill, op. cit. supra, n. 57.
66 Eureka Products Inc. v. Mulligan, op. cit., supra, n. 29. This was a
suit brought against a federal marshal for having destroyed a confiscated
film during the appeal. The destruction was upheld.
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the courts having jurisdiction.6 7 The court having jurisdiction
is the court located in the district in which the book was seized.
68
Customs Censorship Abroad
The practices of other common law nations may provide
some guidance to the solutions of problems alluded to above. In
Australia local officials play only a small part in the whole area
of censorship.69 In order to obtain some uniformity in the treat-
ment of the problem a conference of ministers from all the states
met with representatives of the Commonwealth Government in
1962. At this meeting it was decided "that before any action was
taken against importers, news agents or booksellers, a consulta-
tion should take place between the Commonwealth Department
of Customs and Excise and representatives of the state in-
volved." Thus, in another federal system, a working partnership
to control censorable materials has evolved. 70 Nonetheless,
clearance of a book by Customs does not preclude a subsequent
conviction for violation of a state statute. 71
The British Customs also prosecuted James Joyce's famous
novel, Ulysses. At the time of its first English importation, by
smuggling, copies found in England were seized under the Cus-
toms Act of 1867 and burned before the publisher could take any
legal action. After the book had been cleared for importation by
American courts72 the book has been permitted entry so that
customs censorship is simply ignored.73 Perhaps the most aston-
ishing instance of British Customs censorship occurred in 1957
when a two-volume edition of Jean Genet's novels were seized.
The books, which were in French, had been ordered by the Bir-
mingham Public Library for its reference department. Despite
Genet's excellent reputation as a French literary figure, the Bir-
67 62 Stat. 974, 28 U. S. C. 2463. Applies to customs officials as well, In re
Chichester, 48 F. 281 (C. C. Tex., 1891).
68 In re Behrens, 39 F. 2d 561 (2d Cir., 1930).
69 The Customs Act of 1901, §§ 35, 50, 51 narrowly limits the power of local
officials.
70 Letter from Chief Commissioner of State of Victoria Police, March 21,
1963-in Green, Federalism and the Administration of Criminal Justice,
51 Ky. L. Rev. 667, at 699-700 (1963).
71 Khyte-Powell v. Heinemann, V. R. 425, 434 (Victoria Supreme Court,
1960) is the only Australian case on this point.
72 U. S. v. One Obscene Book Entitled Ulysses, op. cit., supra, n. 62.
73 Craig, The Banned Books of England and Other Countries (1962), pp.
78-79.
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mingham authorities, under great pressure from Customs and
Excise Officers, recanted and refused to resist the seizure of the
books.
7 4
The treatment accorded specific literary works has varied
considerably within the Commonwealth. In New Zealand, Vladi-
mir Nabokov's novel Lolita was seized under the Customs Act
of 1913 and the Indecent Publications Act of 1910. Despite
strong opposition by the New Zealand Council of Civil Liberties,
the prohibition was successful.7 5 In Canada, however, the Su-
preme Court held recently that D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatter-
ly's Lover was not obscene within the definition of the Criminal
Code.76 In this case expert evidence was permitted to show the
purpose of the author and to demonstrate the book's literary and
artistic merits.
Australian censorship appears to be the most rigid in the
Commonwealth. There the Customs Department requires bi-
monthly returns of book importers which are examined against
an index of books already approved. If the book possesses liter-
ary merit a Censorship Board must still review its content for
obscenity according to the Board's own unstated principles.77
It is probable that these restrictive measures do have impact
upon the reading habits of the Australian public.
Conclusion
The constitutional limitations upon the power of customs
censorship have never been clearly stated. Only by inference
may they be ascertained. It is submitted that the time is at hand
when a forthright expression of constitutional doctrine relating
74 The Times (London), July 2, 1957, p. 1, p. 4. It should be pointed out,
in passing, that the Irish Board of Censorship has had, since 1929, perhaps
the most sweeping powers of customs censorship to be found among demo-
cratic nations. One writer comments: "There is now not a single Irish
writer of repute, Catholic as well as non-Catholic, and scarcely a well-
known foreign writer whose work has not been banned." (Barrington,
The Censorship in Eire, 46 Commonweal 429 (1947). See Indecent Publi-
cations Act of 1857, 20 and 21 Vict. C. 83, 10 Halsbury (3d ed.) 666.
75 In re Lolita, N. Z. L. R. 542 (1961). See The Times (London) September
6, 1960, p. 3.
76 Regina v. Brodie, 32 D. L. R. 2d 507 (1962). The Criminal Code, 1953-54
(Can.) C. 51 definition rejected the classical English test of obscenity, as it
has been rejected in the United States, substituting the description: a pub-
lication having "a dominant characteristic . . .which is the undue exploita-
tion of sex."
77 Comment, Australian Censorship 1964, 4 Sydney L. Rev. 396, 401 (1964).
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to customs censorship is needed, if only to allay the qualms of
those who doubt the propriety of censorship of political ideas by
labelling them as propaganda.
It has been intimated that the power of Congress in regard
to foreign commerce may be broader than its power over inter-
state commerce,78 on the ground that it comprehends a branch
of the federal government's power over foreign relations.79 Even
if this may not be so, it is certainly true that the powers are at
least equal by virtue of the fact that the Constitution grants both
powers in the same clause and in the same words.80 If this is
true, then principles surrounding the concept of interstate com-
merce are applicable to foreign commerce.8 '
The federal commerce power does not permit Congress to
avoid the prohibitions and limitations of the Bill of Rights.8 2 If
such regulations unduly infringe personal freedom guaranteed
by the First Amendment the Supreme Court must declare the
statute invalid and unconstitutional.8 3
Congress is powerless to regulate anything unrelated to
commerce and the exercise of the power must have a substantial
relation to some part of commerce.8 4 The power of Congress to
regulate commerce includes the power to prescribe the rules by
which commerce is to be governed. 5 Since regulation may ex-
tend to the point of prohibition Congress has the power to pro-
hibit certain shipments in interstate and foreign commerce.,
The evil or harm may proceed from the noxious character of
articles considered unfit for commerce.8 7 Congress may regulate
78 Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427 (1931).
79 See Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216 (1914) which involves the
illegal importation of opium.
80 Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3: "The Congress shall have power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes." See United States v. Cardene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144
(1937).
81 This is the conclusion of Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, op.
cit. supra, n. 51 at p. 583 in which he says that the doctrines of Gibbons v.
Ogden. 9 Wheat 1 (1824) apply as well to foreign commerce, an assumption
that has been since adopted by the court.
82 United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1940); United States v. Joint
Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505 (1897).
83 American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1949).
84 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1935).
85 United States v. Darby, op. cit., supra, n. 82.
86 United States v. Cardene Products Co., op. cit., supra, note 80.
87 Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co., 299 U. S. 334 (1936).
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commerce to prevent it from being used as an agency to promote
immorality.88
That no one has a vested right to carry on foreign commerce
is established.8 9 But although the importer may not have a right
to import, it is not clear whether the eventual recipient of the
imported item has any rights in the matter. Is not my freedom
to read or to enjoy a picture affected by Customs censorship?
If the exporter abroad and the importer in the United States
have no rights, or have waived them, may the potential customer
complain? Apparently the doctrines on standing and justiciable
interest preclude that possibility."" There is probably at present
no constitutional right to receive an import, or at least no en-
forceable right. Unless the standing of the potential recipient
can be established by extension of a few available precedents9'
only the importer can resist customs censorship.
An importer may raise constitutional or procedural barriers
to customs censorship, but in the case of communist propaganda
there is no apparent importer who may lodge a protest. The
statute may be immune from direct constitutional challenge be-
cause of the absence of any individual with standing to sue. This
regrettable situation could only be remedied by Congressional
amendment of the statute to permit challenge, or by judicial ex-
pansion of the rules concerning standing.
The restrictions on customs censorship of obscene matter are
the same as those applied to any censorship of obscenity by any
agency, state or federal. Trends toward further restrictions upon
censorship bodies will be effective to restrain customs censorship
of materials on the borderline of obscenity. However, it is diffi-
cult to envisage the application of prior censorship concepts to
88 Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 (1955). Whether the same rules appli-
cable to the control of prostitution should apply is another question. See
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1916).
89 University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 48 (1932).
90 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923); especially Tileston v. Ull-
man, 318 U. S. 44 (1943).
91 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 257 (1953) provides a dim hope of
this. A note in 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1400 (1955) ingeniously suggests that Mar-
tin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943) provides the necessary wedge.
That case held that, with respect to handbills distributed from door to door,
that each householder had a right to determine whether he would receive
such visitors and a municipal ordinance could not prohibit that choice. The
court said that "freedom (of speech) embraces the right to distribute liter-
ature . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it." (Ibid., p. 143)
A handbill is not usually an import item, however.
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customs censorship of obscenity, because such an interpretation
would destroy the very foundations of the power of customs cen-
sorship which naturally precedes the potential impact of the pro-
hibited material.
Customs censorship of "matter advocating or urging treason
or insurrection" under the Tariff Act would seem to be subject
to the same objections as have been raised with only slight suc-
cess, against the Smith Act.92 Customs censorship of contracep-
tive information and devices or of lottery materials is also sim-
ilar to other federal legislation which has been sustained.93
Other substantive aspects of the Tariff Act also seem safe against
legal attack.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of customs censorship
is the extent to which procedural safeguards have been effective
in reducing complaints to a minimal level. Unlike the case of
postal censorship, recourse to the federal courts is readily avail-
able to those who disagree with the interpretations of the cus-
toms censor. The public character of these proceedings lends re-
assurance and provides guidance to prospective importers. Se-
crecy or arbitrary conduct is not entirely absent but the experi-
ences under the current Tariff Act have been largely satisfac-
tory, as evidenced by the rarity of litigation. As compared to the
practices of many other nations American customs censorship
seems quite mild.
Nonetheless, the temptation to extend the borders of cus-
toms censorship is ever present. It must be remembered that
the nation was inspired by "foreign" ideas and has been fre-
quently reinvigorated by them. It is to be hoped that the traffic
in ideas will never cease.
92 Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States,
354 U. S. 298 (1957).
93 Besig v. United States, supra n. 60-contraceptives; United States v. 83
Cases Labeled "Honest John," 29 F. Supp. 912 (D. C. Md., 1939).
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